Inadequate disclosure has been at the heart of most policy analysis of the global financial crisis. According to the inadequate disclosure critique, investors had insufficient information regarding the risks involved in structured securities, the flaws of credit ratings, and the impact of excessive executive compensation, all among the main causes of the recent financial market collapse. However, the global financial crisis has also exposed the many limits of disclosure as an effective regulatory tool in the context of financial markets. Most of the risks that led to the creation of the 2008 catastrophe were often fully disclosed but the markets failed to understand what was disclosed and appreciate the implications. The reasons for this failure were product complexity and the impact of socio-psychological factors such as bounded rationality, strategic trade behaviour (herding), and cognitive biases. These findings pose a great challenge to the prevailing rational choice view of disclosure as a regulatory remedy of most market failures. At the same time, the issue of transparent financial markets dominates the global regulatory reform agenda. Accordingly, there is a clear need to devise strategies that make disclosure work under actual (not hypothetical) market conditions. The chapter argues that in specific contexts, such as the field of prudential regulation of banks, disclosure will only work if it is supplemented by protective regulation, e.g., licensing barriers between ‗utility' and ‗casino' banking. It also argues that only through the use of experiments, as a complement to empirical studies, policy-makers and regulators will be able to measure the actual contribution of disclosure to investor protection. It is possible that such studies will show that, in the case of unsophisticated investors, the establishment of an independent financial products committee is a better investor protection strategy than enhanced disclosure.
A. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary financial regulation has made disclosure the centerpiece of the regulatory armoury.
Though disclosure has traditionally been viewed by English case law as an effective way to protect investors in the context of public offerings, even in the laissez faire arm's length securities markets of the 19 th century, 1 it really became an indispensable weapon of the regulatory arsenal in the early 1930s. In an attempt to clean up US markets from abuse in the post-1929 crash era, the Roosevelt administration created widespread disclosure regimes for securities issuers and traders by means of the so-called New Deal Statutes: mainly Securities Act 1933 2 and Securities and Exchange Act 1934. 3 However, disclosure completed its ascent to the ‗regulatory Olympus' in the past twenty five years for reasons that had little to do with the battle against fraud and market abuse.
With the advent of financial liberalization and with the aid of modern finance theory, but not with its full endorsement, policy-makers and regulators came to view financial markets as an agglomeration of rational investors, who make optimal resource allocation and wealth maximization decisions, when provided with sufficient information and appropriately structured economic incentives. So all regulators had to do to safeguard efficient markets and help investors was to ensure that a vast volume of pertinent information entered the public domain in any given area of financial market activity. Then, on the basis of all available information, market actors would adjust their investment decisions, positions, and strategies to information's content and the market would essentially regulate itself. Thus, no further consideration was usually given to other very important issues, such as the question whether market actors used all of the disclosed information and if so what kind of decisions they took on the basis of abundant supplies of information.
As a result, based on the rational investor model, modern financial regulation stretched the disclosure paradigm and reliance on self-regulation way beyond its original realm of issuer disclosure 7 CDOs are typically set up by investment banks or fund managers and comprise securitized interests in pools of generally non-mortgage assets. Assets in the pool, called collateral, usually comprise loans or debt instruments and are called collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) or collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) depending on whether the collateral is only loans or bonds respectively.
8 CDS is a swap in which two parties enter into an agreement whereby one party pays the other a fixed periodic coupon for the specified life of the agreement. The other party makes no payments unless a specified ‗credit event' occurs. CDSs are normally concluded under the ISDA architecture and ‗credit events' are typically defined to include a material default, bankruptcy or debt restructuring for a specified reference asset. If a ‗credit event' occurs, the party makes a payment to the first party, and the swap then terminates. The size of the payment is usually linked to the decline in the reference asset's market value following the occurrence of such ‗credit event'.
investors been given higher quality information they would have approached structured credit securities with caution and they would not have been overexposed to these markets. Also well informed capital markets would have punished companies with executive and trader compensation schemes that fostered short-termism, inspite of bringing to them mega-profits.
The inadequate disclosure critique has not, however, been fully endorsed by all analysts of the global financial crisis. A minority of commentators have argued that closer examination shows that investors had in many cases sufficient information about the risks of their investment strategies and of the financial products used to implement them. 9 Yet market actors could not properly process available information in those cases and adjust their positions to the riskiness of structured credit securities for a variety of reasons. First, due to product complexity, boundedly rational investors failed to understand the mechanics and risks of shadow banking and structured credit securities. 10 Second, because of market players' tendency to herd, responding strategically to other market actors' behaviour, these did not have the capacity or the desire to use in a rational way the disclosed information and take contrarian positions. Third, the influence of other behavioural factors such as the use of heuristics, 11 and investor overconfidence in times of market euphoria, because of abundance of easy credit and rising market prices, meant that investors chose to ignore the warning signals in the disclosed data in favour of over-reliance on credit ratings. 12 Arguably, the view taken by this second group of commentators makes the inadequate disclosure argument a much less powerful explanation of the global financial crisis and the initial focus on increased disclosure, as the lynchpin of global regulatory reform, puzzling! [M]ay employ multiple decision-making programs concurrently, and the actuation of each program may depend on the underlying context in systematic ways. In some contexts, conscious decision-making may share many features of Rational Choice Theory. In other moments, unconscious or intuitive processes may intervene, affecting the information that reaches our deliberative processes, the weight we give to various pieces of information, the time and attention devoted to choosing through deliberation, and our willingness to choose based on the outcome of deliberation instead of an ‗intuition' about what is right.
The above observation essentially means that, instead of focusing on the unitary theories of decisionmaking like rational choice and prospect theory, it is better to understand human decision-making as the product of multiple-processes. 31 As a result, individual cognitive processes may become dominant in different context-specific situations and cross-context comparisons may potentially lead to observed inconsistencies in behaviour.
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It is the author's view that the phenomenally inconsistent way that market actors use disclosed information constitutes evidence of employment of multiple decision-making programmes concurrently. This view is further re-enforced by the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics, 33 users of multiple decision-making programmes. In fact, neuroeconomics has raised doubts as to whether the two identified systems of decision-making even exist/operate separately. Three well known neuroscientists have noted in a recent paper: ‗[t]here is, for example, no evidence that there is an emotional system, per se, and a rational system, per se, for decision making at the neurobiological level.' 34 They have added that viewing the human brain as a collection of two distinct decisionmaking processes/systems, one emotional/irrational, and one deliberative/rational may serve well economists trying to make sense of human behaviour but it has no grounds in neurobiology.
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Taking into consideration the above observations, it is assumed that it would be difficult, probably impossible, to untangle conscious and deliberative processing of disclosed information by market actors in order to evaluate its impact on their decision-making. Relevant research would possibly show that sometimes the disclosed information is used in a deliberative way leading to outcomes that are consistent with rational choice theory. Other times, non-conscious (intuitive), automatic decision-making processes will be found to account for market phenomena that do not fit with the rational choice prescribed outcomes and are called by behavioural finance scholars ‗market puzzles' or ‗anomalies'. 36 Because these automatic processes intervene, short-circuit, or overrule deliberative processes they may develop into a cognitive bias, which induces behaviour inconsistent with rational choice/expected utility theory. 37 As explained in section D below, this finding, also 35 ‗Recently, a number of economists have begun to suggest, at a psychological level, that human decision making can be broken down into two categories; typically rational and irrational . . . What we cannot stress strongly enough is that the vast majority of evolutionary biologists and neurobiologists reject this view. There are probably two principle reasons that biologists reject this dualist view of the nervous system; one neurobiological and one behavioral. First there is no neurobiological evidence that emotional and non-emotional systems are fully distinct in the architecture of the primate brain. Second, there is no evidence that rational and irrational behavior are the product of two distinct brain systems, one of which is uniquely rational and one of which is uniquely irrational.' Ibid.
36 See Barberis and Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, supra n 23. 37 Arlen and Talley, supra n 29, xix, xx, xxviii.
disclosure as a protective regulatory technique may be properly ascertained leading to the formulation of disclosure policies, techniques, and formats that really aid individual investor and market welfare.
(b) Bounded rationality and herding as a barriers to rational reaction to disclosed information
There are two additional factors that seem to limit the effectiveness of disclosure. First, bounded rationality 38 may account for market actors' limited understanding of disclosed information regarding highly complex financial instruments. 39 Second, herding (strategic trade behaviour), either due to peer pressure or in response to career/reputational concerns, also means that disclosed information is ignored in favour of the safer ‗follow the herd' strategy. 40 Thus, herding places a very powerful limitation on rational reaction to all kinds of disclosed information.
Because individuals are boundedly rational, as securitisation markets grew and products became more complex, expert investors showed limited capacity for understanding the disclosed mechanics and calculate the attendant risks of structured credit products and for developing tools to value them. Instead, as explained in paragraph C.2 below, investors replaced rigorous credit controls and valuation models with over-reliance on credit ratings.
Furthermore, institutions' herding has been recognized as one of the main builders and amplifiers of the crisis in the recent review of Lord Turner into the causes of the global financial crisis. 41 Herding is often due to irrational exuberance. Yet it is even more caused by the ‗beauty contests', first described by Keynes, 42 in their post-modern form, which intrinsically links them to the agency problem. Performance affects bonus payments and the bankers' and fund managers' tenure in the job. This might seem like a reasonable response to noise trader activity. Professional investors follow the herd and its trading choices playing the ‗momentum game' 46 in the hope that they will be able to sell and materialize their gains, before noise traders decide to sell. Namely, bankers, traders, and fund managers concentrate on trades and trading techniques that enable them, if not to beat the 42 ‗[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. It is an undisputable fact that as regards structured credit products lack of standardization, and in the case of CDSs inherently limited, if not non-existent, disclosure, meant that the market had considerable difficulty to fill the gaps and properly evaluate the risks of those securities. Thus, it
could not price them with any degree of accuracy. This built uncertainty that eventually gripped the markets, following the trigger of the credit crisis. The same uncertainty also prevented new entrants to the structured products market. Furthermore, banks either deliberately or because of their own ignorance gave the market incomplete information regarding their on-and off-balance sheet exposures to structured credit products. As a result, fears about the true size of their exposures led to considerable reluctance by counterparties to trade and the subsequent amplification of the market turmoil.
Moreover, in the highly complex and fast moving environment of global financial markets it is easy for regulators to make the wrong choice regarding the kind of data that has to be disclosed. Vehicles (SIVs) and thus of the institution's actual exposure to them. 52 The cause of some of these failures, however, was not lack of information but inappropriate use of what was disclosed, due, no less, to behavioural factors.
For example, in the case of credit ratings, institutional buyers and sellers of structured credit securities used credit ratings in order to price them, when reliable price quotations were unavailable, 53 which in the case of structured credit products was not unusual. As a result, credit ratings came to play a key role in the ‗valuation of customized or illiquid structured credit products'. 54 However, these highly sophisticated market participants knew all too well that the ratings produced by the major Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) suffered several shortcomings. First, they were built to measure.
Namely, the issuers of the products were using CRA know how and software in order to build baskets of securities that would ensure an AAA rating. Second, the insatiable appetite of global markets for credit ratings and the fact that the relevant market was highly oligopolistic -three major agencies:
Standard & Poors, Fitch, and Moody's have traditionally dominated the market -meant that the industry suffered from a serious lack of incentives to seriously stress test credit ratings, a fact that was well known to most market professionals. Third, CRAs were often subject to considerable conflicts of interest, as the buyers of their ratings were the issuers whose products they rated. 55 obligations emanating from a multitude of obligors, did not make public the estimated correlation of obligors in the asset pool; disclosure of the cross-correlations would have greatly assisted investors in assessing whether the rating was based on expectations which were in-line with their own. Finally, asset value in the case of securities is often intrinsically linked to the marketability/liquidity of a financial product but this parameter was not measured by credit ratings.
Of course, modellers and risk managers in most institutions understood very well the implications of the absence of such information and yet chose to continue relying on credit ratings. So it is really mystifying why so much importance was placed on ratings and why big, well resourced, and highly sophisticated banks and other institutional investors chose to ignore all of the aforementioned faults and perform little or no in-house credit analysis of their investments.
Arguably, there are two ways to explain why big institutions chose to substitute proper analysis and due diligence for ‗a subscription to a ratings publication'. 56 The rational choice explanation is that in order to economise in substantial research costs and thus facilitate transactions, investors chose to ignore the known flaws of credit ratings. Yet given how pronounced, serious, and well known were those flaws, this explanation does not sound convincing. Therefore, the second explanation, which highlights the behavioural aspects of investor reliance on credit ratings, is also worth considering.
It is possible that investor ‗irrational' reliance on credit ratings was the result of the operation of the availability and representativeness heuristics. 57 Namely, market participants relying much more heavily on heuristics rather than any rational computations came to the conclusion that painstaking and accurate calculations of market value were not necessary for structured credit products. There was 57 The availability heuristic controls estimates of the frequency or probability of events, which are judged by the ease with which instances of such events come to mind. In other words, the availability heuristic is an assessment of accessibility. The representativeness heuristic is used by individuals to evaluate probability. Much of the time, representativeness is a helpful heuristic, but it can generate some severe biases.
no memory of serious failures of the ratings process, since structured credit securities were predominantly new products without long trading histories. On the contrary, given also the prevailing conditions of market euphoria, credit ratings, inspite of their shortcomings, could serve as a usable, although inaccurate, benchmark of value so that trading and profiteering could go on. Namely, rational actors' cognitive limitations and focus on short-term profit, forced sophisticated investors to ignore the warning signals. This explains both the incredible amount of trust placed on the ratings of CRAs and why these ‗had grown more powerful than anyone intended'.
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Additional credibility to the above argument is lent by the fact that, while investors and regulators were placing nearly blind trust on credit ratings, CRAs frequently warned the market about the true function of their ratings. Naturally, their warnings were neither very prominent nor widely publicized. 59 Yet a rational investor, given also the vast technical sophistication and expertise available to institutional investors, would have easily identified and properly incorporated them into their decision making model discounting instead of exaggerating the importance of credit ratings.
(b) Consumer protection
There is a rational choice explanation of the subprime crisis that focuses on inadequate disclosure of risks, especially once so called ‗teaser' rates had ceased and interest payments adjusted to higher rates, and of the mortgage brokers' conflicts of interest. 60 According to this approach US sub-prime borrowers did not obtain loans that they could not afford on the basis of their income, job prospects, and value of their asset, they simply did not have enough information to make a rational risk analysis of their investment. This approach is, of course, not inaccurate when it comes to the unscrupulous practices of US mortgage brokers, but it also greatly discounts an undisputable fact. US subprime borrowers were buying into a ‗dream': the infinite rise of US housing market. Even if the risks of the 58 IMF, GFSR, Containing Systemic Risks, supra n 53, 56.
59 Ibid., 55. ‗Although credit rating agencies insist that ratings measure only default risk, and not the likelihood or intensity of downgrades or mark-to-market losses, many investors were seemingly unaware of these warnings and disclaimers.' Id.
mortgage were not properly disclosed it was not difficult to figure out that US housing price markets were at historical highs and this growth could not last forever. Nor was it a secret to both borrowers and lenders that they borrowed/lent money in excess of the already over-priced asset's value.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that inadequate disclosure and sharp practice were the sole culprits of the explosion of US sub-prime loans.
Collective speculative fever, usually called irrational exuberance and, perhaps, the inherent inability of a segment of the population, due to low levels of education and financial expertise, to fully understand the risks involved were possibly more important factors. A rising US housing market, which was also followed by rising housing markets in most of western countries, led to credit consumer overconfidence. Namely, mortgage borrowers in the US and the rest of Western world, anchored 61 to the prevailing environment of low interest rates and overconfident that rising house prices would last forever, rushed to jump on the property bandwagon, playing the ‗momentum game'.
In doing so they were rather reluctant to engage into careful calculations regarding the sustainability of their borrowings. Of course, if overconfidence and inability to make an informed financial decision were at the heart of consumers' credit decisions in the context of sub-prime loans, it is unlikely that consumers would have acted much differently, if they had been given accurate information about the risks of sub-prime lending and the conflicts of interest of the intermediating brokers. excessive levels of liquidity in global financial markets, and rising asset prices. Also, they misunderstood, due to their complexity, the mechanics of innovative financial instruments and believed that credit risk they were transferring to SIVs through securitisations or to counterparties through CDSs was, in fact, disappearing from the system and from their balance sheets. This belief was totally flawed and just exhibited their limited understanding of financial innovation.
(c) Banking Regulation
The chief objective of banking regulation is the prevention of financial collapses, because they are highly contagious, due to the nature of the banking industry, and they can evolve, aided by market panic, to full scale financial cascades threatening the stability of the financial system. Probably the most important regulatory tool used to buttress banking institutions' financial health and soundness is the regulatory standards of so-called capital adequacy. The standards currently applicable to the majority of international banks are those fashioned by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
The third pillar of the Basel II Accord provides an increased number of regulatory and market disclosures by regulated banks in order to enhance market discipline. 64 This is based on the assumption that, if the regulatory capital positions and risk exposures of international banks are regularly disclosed, banks facing difficulties, because, for instance, they pursue risky business policies, will be restrained / disciplined, as the rest of the market will become increasingly unwilling to lend them money. Thus, disclosure has become one of the most important tools of monitoring and enforcement of capital adequacy regulation. 63 In fact, banks kept an exposure to the securitised loans with the lowest quality in order to make the issue desirable to investors. At the same time, credit risk was piling up in hidden parts of the system, because of shadow banking and credit default swaps, but did not at all disappear.
64 Banks are required under the Basel II Accord to regularly disclose, inter alia, (a) the composition of their Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, the total amount of capital, and the accounting policies they use for the valuation of their assets and liabilities, (b) an exposure assessment comprising information about the asset side of balance sheet, the different types of risk to which the bank is exposed and the amounts exposed, the method used for calculating those risks, the external credit agency used for the risk-weighting purposes, in the case of banks using the standardized approach, and general information on the risk assessment methodology used, in the case of banks using the Internal Ratings Based approach and the capital requirements for each different type of risk and the total capital requirements.
However, this view was either naïve or just exhibited a metaphysical belief in self-regulation.
In the absence of properly calibrated objectives, because of the possibility of public bank rescues and deposit insurance, the role of market discipline is rather marginal. 65 The fact that all big banks enjoy an implicit public guarantee means, in practice, that even badly run banks will probably not be allowed to fail, and, if they do, the taxpayer and the deposit insurance scheme will cover most of creditors' losses. This means that, first the ailing bank's management can afford to continue behaving irresponsibly and, second, its creditors may continue lending it funds without any substantial fear of losses that an institution's bankruptcy would entail, significantly weakening market discipline.
This obstacle to market discipline is magnified by the fact that by the very nature of its business the banking industry creates interconnectedness. Given the operation of the government guarantee, banking institutions have a strong incentive to grow their asset book (loans), since the larger the institution becomes and the more inter-connected the more likely is that its failure will also drag down other inter-connected institutions. The Goodhart Report calls this risk the ‗interconnectedness spillover'. 66 Obviously, the bigger the institution and the more inter-connected the more likely that the government will recue it in the event of failure. 67 This, in turn, creates powerful perverse incentives to expand a banking institution's balance sheet obliterating the restraining power of market discipline.
However, even if it was possible to eliminate moral hazard and fashion appropriate incentives so that bank creditors became effective monitors of banks, in which case extensive market disclosure would have been very useful, still market monitoring would mean little in terms of preventing 65 A view that was tentatively based on CW Calomiris and CM Kahn, ‗The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements' (1991) 81 American Economic Review 497-513. This analysis focused on the role of demandable bank debt in disciplining bankers. However, the strength of the countervailing power possessed by the ‗too big to fail' doctrine and, of course, deposit insurance was not accounted for. To account for these limitations Calomiris argued in a subsequent article for banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance, while at the same time restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurred. See CW Calomiris, ‗Building an Incentive-compatible Safety Net ' (1999) Because of systemic interdependence, the individual bank's risk exposure cannot be ascertained by just looking at the bank's assets and liabilities, on balance sheet and off balance sheet. If the bank's asset position involves a certain risk and the bank has hedged this risk by contracting with a third party, the effectiveness of the hedge depends on the third party's ability to fulfil its obligations when needed. If the risk in question is of macroeconomic dimension, an interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, or a housing-price risk, the counterparty's ability to fulfil its obligation depends on how many similar contracts it has concluded with other market participants. If risk correlations across contracts are such that the counterparty to the hedge must deliver on many of them at the same time, this in itself may destroy the counterparty's viability.
In today's globalized markets, there is no private institution that possibly has the ability, resources, and access to information to be able to conduct a credit analysis of all other financial institutions, regulated and unregulated. Furthermore, even if such institution existed, the colossal costs of universal monitoring would far exceed the expected benefits.
Second, even if a financial institution behaves individually in a prudent way, or even if all financial institutions behave in a prudent, but un-coordinated, way a systemic crisis may not be averted. Especially in the event of a liquidity crunch even the prudent behaviour of one financial institution can create spillovers that may undermine the stability of other institutions leading to systemic instability. This problem is due to another (risk-spillover) externality: Fire-sales.
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According to the Goodhart Report:
[T]he fire-sale externality arises since each individual financial institution does not take into account the price impact its own fire-sales will have on asset prices in a possible future liquidity crunch. Hence, fire-sales by some institutions spillover, and adversely affect the balance sheet of others, causing a negative externality.
D. WHAT FUTURE OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION?
Prudential Regulation
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, none of the disclosure's limitations diminishes its importance. They just call for a radical rethinking of the disclosure paradigm in financial regulation.
Clearly in the context of capital markets the pre-eminence given to disclosure as a regulatory technique is unwarranted, given also the costs it entails for the producer of the disclosed information, if information so disclosed is not properly processed by investors and does not target specific areas of market activity, where it is most effective. In other areas, such as banking regulation, disclosure is not sufficient to enforce, by means of market discipline, the prudent operation of individual institutions and the protection of the system from the risk of contagion.
In the field of banking regulation disclosure will remain a strong supervisory tool only if it is used to supplement the impact of protective rules. It is not accidental that both of the influential reviews of banking regulation issued in recent months: the Goodhart Report and the Turner Review place much more emphasis on revamped capital adequacy regulation and straightjacket protective rules and less, if any at all, on disclosure.
Proposals for the introduction of restrictive regulation in banking markets include calls for the imposition of dynamic pre-provisioning obligations, so that banks set aside more capital in good times in order to restrain the credit flows to the economy that may feed asset bubbles, 70 and of an upper level (maximum gross) leverage ratio for banks. 71 Furthermore, academic commentators have suggested that inherent moral hazard in the banking industry, the cognitive limitations of human actors, the impact of the agency problem, and the inability of disclosure to solve any of these problems call for the imposition of restrictions on the kind of business activities savings and loans banks should undertake. To the untrained eye the future of disclosure as a regulatory technique in the context of capital markets could look rather bleak. However, there are good reasons why this is not so. These include the undisputable benefits disclosure brings in battling market abuse and democratizing capital markets, and thus encouraging access to them, fostering liquid markets. What is really required is the adaptation of disclosure techniques, volume, format, and content to actual market conditions.
Arguably, this means that disclosure regulation reform should be guided by empirical and experimental studies 74 that measure the actual impact of disclosed information, and thus the effectiveness of disclosure rules.
As mentioned in section B, experimental studies may be particularly useful in this context.
Experimental economics' focus on an ecological concept of rationality, which asks questions as to why a specific social practice, or a specific game, has been chosen instead of another, may be exactly what is needed to measure the true impact of disclosure rules on investor decisions and market efficiency. For instance, experimental economics holds that, in competitive markets, and financial markets are normally highly contested markets, institutions (the rules of the game) matter, because they determine information and private incentives. 75 But the incentives to which people respond are 73 Turner Review, supra n 13, 43, 94. 74 The value of experimental studies in testing financial regulation has also been stressed elsewhere, especially in evaluating the effectiveness of laws designed to limit market imperfections such as asset price bubbles in the context of complex adaptive markets. See EF Gerding, ‗Laws to be identified here is why market actors behave in particular way, while in possession of full information, rather than how market actors behave in the same circumstances, such evidence is difficult to be derived from empirical studies. Third, assessing how market actors process information is a rather complex issue and will also require the conduct of qualitative studies (interviews, questionnaires) to accompany/interpret empirical data observations. However, qualitative studies in
this context are open to manipulation by the subjects of the study, who will probably lie in many contexts in order to present themselves much more ‗clever', alert, or rational and much less prone to peer pressure than their actual market behaviour would indicate. On the other hand, in the controlled environment of an experiment, using real life subjects, many of these problems may be overcome.
This makes experiments very useful and reliable method to gauge the actual impact of disclosed information on market actors' behaviour, though their results shall be a useful basis for law reform only if they do not conflict with the results of quantitative empirical studies.
It is hoped that, following the conduct of the discussed extensive empirical and experimental studies, a new framework for the use of disclosure, as a regulatory technique in capital markets, will emerge. One of the issues that will have to be addressed is financial product complexity. Important steps are already taken in this area with respect to increased product standardization and enhancement 80 Ibid, xviii.
81 Ibid, xxxii.
of clearing and settlement infrastructure. These initiatives are bound to improve the transparency of the market for structured credit securities and complexity may well stop being the problem that it proved to be during the global financial crisis. However, experiments may also prove helpful in this
area, if what is tested is whether complex financial contracts should, at any rate, be marketed and sold to certain investor classes.
A Financial Products Safety Committee?
The above observation leads us to one of the thorniest questions that experiments on the effectiveness of disclosure regulation must address. Is disclosure enough with respect to the investment decisions taken by certain classes of retail investors, who present limited financial sophistication and are also at the lower ranks of the earnings and education ladder? On the basis of present evidence, there is room for a prediction that experiments may lead to the conclusion that disclosure of information under whatever format or technique might have to be complemented with soft paternalism mechanisms, administration. Thus, there is an expectation that legislation will soon be introduced establishing an independent financial products safety commission in the US.
Since the EU and many other geographic regions did not experience a subprime mortgages scandal suggesting such a strongly paternalistic solution to the problems retail financial services consumers face may be found unacceptable in many countries. On the other hand, just expecting brokers and other financial advisors to act as champions of consumer protection for their clients, on the basis of relevant suitability and general conduct of business rules is an inadequate and sometimes unrealistic protection mechanism. Relevant rules oblige providers and sellers (financial advisors and brokers) of financial products to disclose as much information as possible for the products' nature and risk and ascertain whether that's suitable for the customer's risk profile. Yet sometimes these rules either do not work properly. First, brokers/financial advisors try as much as legally possible to avoid complying with them, no less due to the complexity of relevant rules. Second, the rules' effect is limited because of the explained above limited ability of consumers to understand what is disclosed and regularly act on such information in a rational way. Therefore, an independent experts/consumers watchdog that would advise, scrutinize, and recommend options for financial products, rather than regulate them, or prohibit them from entering the market, as the US proposals seems to suggest, would be, on the basis of the preceding discussion, a very positive development.
E. CONCLUSION
The old disclose and self-regulate paradigm in financial markets is dead, no less because of its role in bringing about the current global financial catastrophe. However, this does not diminish the value of disclosure as regulatory technique, it simply calls for a substantial overhaul of its processes, volume, timing, and format, in order to make it more effective. This chapter undertook the bold task of considering disclosure's future in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in order to incorporate into the new disclosure paradigm the lessons learnt by the crisis. After highlighting the disclosure rationale in contemporary financial regulation, it opened two new lines of enquiry intending to measure the welfare benefits of disclosure. First, it investigated whether the prominent role that is accorded by international banking regulation to market discipline, aided by extensive disclosure, in preventing behaviour that endangers systemic stability is justified? Second, it considered how useful is extensive disclosure of information to retail/unsophisticated investors, especially for those lower down in the income and educational pyramid?
The chapter's findings show that premising banking regulation on disclosure and market discipline was a flawed approach that endangered the stability of the global financial system.
Disclosure can have a constructive role in banking regulation only as a supplement to strict protective rules that limit the kind of activities an institution may undertake and restrain its risk-taking appetite.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the disclosure conundrum in capital markets shall only be resolved if disclosure rules are subjected to extensive and rigorous empirical and experimental studies. It is possible that such studies will show that, inspite of the existence of extensive disclosure regimes, certain classes of individual investors also need to be aided by the introduction of default choices. This is a role that should be assigned to an independent public body that is not susceptible to regulatory capture.
